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THE OBSOLESCENCE OF CRIMINAL GUILT
J. J. M. SCANDERETT
I. General Considerations
"We know that the will is free, and there's an end of that."
-Samuel Johnson, 1759.
"We know nothing of the sort, and there's an end of that."
-Arthur Brisbane, 1930.
It has been suggested that the two opinions above express more
than a mere individual difference of opinion between two eminent
publicists, rather epitomizing, perhaps, a profound change in the
attitude of the people of the Western Hemisphere during tow cen-
turies, the drift, in short, from free will to determinism. In the
field of criminology such an evolution is manifest. There one finds
today a particularly sensational illustration of the commonly ob-
served discrepancy between the tradition-caked rules of law and the
practical needs of the instant social organization.
That nullification precedes legal housecleaning might be stated
as a maxim, although such nullification may often be unconscious,
hence appearing in the historical record by inference only, and
therefore, of course, often overlooked by the superficial observer.
Augustus was monarch in fact, though not in name; the Carlo-
vingians ruled for .generations as "mayors of the palace"; similarly
medieval English lawyers solemnly made use of fictions rather than
open revision of the law in order to bridge the gap between the
tradition and practical necessity, which, as they have abundantly
shown, "knows no law"; and so today, while controversy is waged
on the question of capital punishment,' the juries evince their
disapproval of the death penalty by declining to convict the accused.
Finally, and yet more significantly for the purposes of this discussion,
the whole fabric of the criminal law as it exists today is as porous
as mosquito-netting.2 The inexorableness of nature, as contrasted
with human society's floundering for regularity, or, to use the more
'Kavanaugh, Marcus, and Lawes, Lewis A.: Does the Death Penalty Curb
Crime? 33 Current History 356 (1930).




precise language of science, the inevitable modification of the
original hypothesis, as shown false by experiment, is thus excellently
illustrated. When one reflects that the period of our recorded social
experience, in comparison to the age of the world, is but as a postage
stamp pasted bn top of a high mountain, impatience at this flounder-
ing should vanish, perhaps. Paradoxically, however, it seems that
those who contemplate the least of the panorama of time are most
unhurried of all to substitute another garment for the swaddling
clothes of certain of our social institutions.
Scholars have now come to recognize the evolutionary quality
of the law, that injustice is not absolute, and, as remarked by Dean
Pound3 and others4 that the law must adapt itself to the change of
ethical standards brought about by changing social patterns. In the
words of Dr. Pound:
"While jurists have been arguing the relations of jurisprudence and
ethics, others have been urging upon them the relation of jurisprudence
and economics, the relation of jurisprudence and politics, and the rela-
tion of jurisprudence and sociology. Indeed one could say on each of
these subjects much ihat has been said as to law and morals and could
reach much the same result. Jurisprudence, ethics, economics, politics,
and sociology are distinct enough at the core, but shade out into each
other. When we look at the core or chiefly at the core, the analytical
distinctions are sound enough. But we shall not understand even that
core, and much less the debatable ground beyond, unless we are pre-
pared to make continual deep incursions from each into each of the
others. All the social sciences must be co-workers with jurisprudence.
When we set off a bit of social control and define its bounds by analytical
criteria and essay to study it by its own light and with its own materials
and its own methods exclusively, our results, however logical in appear-
ance, are as arbitrary and as futile for any but theoretical purposes, as
the division of the body of the defaulting debtor among his co-creditors
in primitive law. The whole body could not be held by each; therefore
a surgical operation was required to divide it among them."
The same author specifically shows, also, the reluctance of the
interpreters of law to realize this, a phase of cultural lag with which
we all are familiar, some of us painfully so.5
The recognition of the revolutionary modification of law, or at
least of its hypothetical character, is not, however, an immediate
novelty. To go back only five centuries, the English Courts of Equity
a Pound, Roscoe: Law and Morals, pp. 122-4.
4 Kohler, Jos.: Evolution of Law. (Primitive and Ancient Legal Institutions-
Wigmore and Kocourek.) Carter, J. C.: Law, Its Origin, Growth and Function.
pp. 160, 268.
5 Pound, Roscoe: "The End of Law, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 195.
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are founded upon a recognition of the existence of fundamental
principles paramount to legal precedents. Counterparts of this
English institution could probably be found in every society, how-
ever ancient, which advanced beyond the simplicity of tribal ex-
istence.
This highest "'aw" has in the past described variously as the
"Divine Law, .... conscience," "natural right," " the moral sense," etc.,
according to the religio-philosophy of the time and place.6 Such
criteria having proved entirely too vague, shifting, and elusive, the
recent tendency, concurrent with the decline of religious supersti-
tion and the beginnings of the hopefully-entitled social sciences, has
been toward standards of deeper definition. This has been an espe-
cially pressing necessity in view of the unprecedented shift from
primary group life to secondary which characterizes the social or-
ganizations of today, particularly in the United States of America.
Thus social values have come under a more critical scrutiny,
and a vocabulary of a less emotional sort brought into use. Ex-
tremists assert that conscience is no more than "farsighted selfish-
ness, 17 and that "right" conduct is as likely'as not based on fear of
the consequences of "wrong" conduct." The claim is made that moral
sentiment originated in primitive man's recognition of the maxim
that there is safety in numbers,9 that uniformity of environment gave
rise to uniform behavior patterns, 0 which became custom," which
became right.12 The Deity is thus, as it were, exercised. To call a
man good or bad will no longer do. He is or is not "socialized."
1 3
Man, once in the image of God, is now, thanks to Darwin et al., a
human animal, though having a psychological makeup that is not
merely personal but social also, and therein lies his virtue, if virtue
he hath,'14 for unless we satisfy ourselves that this animal has indeed
"the desire to help others," inherent or environmental, along with
his selfishness, it cannot be said that he has any social nature at
6 Carter, J. C.: Op. cit., pp. 131, 165, 174. Blackstone: Commentaries, I, p. 41.
Post, A. H.: Ethnological Jurisprudence. (Primitive and Ancient Legal Institu-
tions, pp. 34-5.) del Vecchio, Georgio: Science of Universal Comparative Law.
(Primitive and Ancient Legal Institutions, p. 65.) Austin, John: Jurisprudence:
I, pp. 105, 144.
7 Carter, J. C.: Op. cit., pp. 152-3.
s Ibid., p. 124.
9 Ibid., p. 126.
10 Tarde, Gabriel: Les Transformations du Droit. (Primitive and Ancient
Legal Institutions, p. 38.)
11 Sumner, W. G.: Folkways, passim.
12 Carter, J. C.: Op. cit., p. 123.
143 Ibid., p. 148.
14 Post, A. H.: Op. cit., p. 15.
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all. In such an event the principles of Christianity must be rejected
as illusory, the utterances of its founder classified as the pratings
of a fool, and the allegedly civilized world must continue to be a
moral jungle. In other words, "business is business."
But there is plain reason, it seems, for a different opinion, un-
acceptable though it evidently is in practice to a majority of the
race of men now living; for whereas in some individuals the we-feel-
ing is so feebly developed as to be scarcely extensible to include
one's own immediate family, and mother-love is extolled in song
and cinema as the highest expression of human loyalty, there have
lived and now live those in whom that sense of comradeship has
reached such proportions as to engulf all their selfish inclinations.
It was said of the late Eugene V. Debs, for example, that he would
not only embrace his fellow-man but give him his coat, and whose
own words, a fitting text to his life, ring with the harmony of organ
music: "While there is a soul in prison, I am not free." Thus there
is evidence to support the conviction that there are non-predatory
possibilities in the future evolution of the human race and civiliza-
tion.
That there are no separate pieces to history is evident.'" How-
ever it seems that wherever one focusses attention upon a point in
the evolution of social behavior, of which crime is a persistent item,
there can be discerned as one of the most important threads a rea-
sonably clear degree of we-ness. There are always those who belong
and those who do not, and it might be postulated that the social
soundness of a community is measurable by the proportion of those
who are actual members, economically as well as politically. Such
a criterion at least accords with the fundamentl dogma of de-
mocracy, and by it can be measured the extent to which the house
is divided against itself. Specifically, in dealing with the problem
of criminal conduct one should take pains to determine at the outset
whether he is going to regard the individual malefactor as a mem-
ber of society or merely as an inept tool failing in its intended use-
fulness to an exclusive group of this-or thatocrats.
Even authoritative writers upon social subjects sometimes make
the eminently fallacious assumption of the membership of all in the
community. For example, the state has been defined as "the political
organization of the individuals for the common good." 10 Regrettable
-. Maitland. F. W.: A Prologue of a History of English Law. (Selected Es-
says in Anglo-American Legal History. I. p. 52.)
1. Blackmar, F. W., and Gillin, J. L.: Outlines of Sociology, p. 162.
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though it may be, such has never yet been the case, except possibly
in a few sporadic utopian communities and in savage tribes of the
very simplest group-life. It is generally conceded that such is not
quite the case even in Soviet Russia, conceded by those who are
disinterested students as well as by emigres and repudiated cred-
itors. The idea of a general distribution of shares in community
benefits was so novel at the time of the twelve disciples that they
did not even grasp it; it was soon, with the help of St. Paul, for-
gotten, and not revived until the eighteenth century, when for the
first time it received wide currency; since then it has been a fashion-
able philosophy of the western world. But even today, certainly as
far as criminals are concerned, it is at most a distant ideal, clung
to by some but for immediate practical purposes discountenanced
by most, including a majority of the conspicuously influential. Vin-
dictiveness is still the keynote, and naturally so, since it is simple,
emotional, unthinking, and in accord with historical tradition, root
and branch.
II. Guilt in Primitive Society
Although conclusions regarding primary cultural origins must
be to a large extent guesswork," it may be stated with reasonable
accuracy that the very idea of crime is anthropologically a recent
development. Simple societies do not betray a recognition of a
type of conduct which we style criminal, nor a practice of punish-
ment."8 It has frequently been noted, often with some astonishment,
by observers of present-day primitives, that these people do not
even punish their young children. Force among them is an ex-
tremely intertribal practice, not intratribal. Their we-ness, like
the esprit of the Marine Corps, is virtually complete, solid,'19 and un-
doubting, so that group control is independent of any coercion. There
is no need of the individual's defending himself against another
17 Cairns, Huntington: Law and Anthropology, 31 Columbia L. Rev., pp. 40-41-
"The origins of customs and institutions are irretrievably lost even beyond
the possibility of discovery by- the prehistorian. . . . But anthropology can
exhibit to us, in studies of ruder cultures, other forms of the customs and
institutions which constitute the social organization of our particular civiliza-
tion. When the parts of primitive social organization have been collected
and compared on a more extensive scale than that with which the anthro-
pologist at present works, it may be possible to construct a scheme of social
evolution which will be, if not history, at least the best available substitute
for history."
18 Faris, Ellsworth: The Origin of Punishment. (Primitive and Ancient Legal
Institutions, pp. 153-60.)
19 Pike, L. 0.: History of Crime in England, II, p. 496.
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individual of his own tribe. In a sense there are no individuals. The
American Indian was not even able to comprehend the idea of
private property, although keenly sensitive to tribal encroachments.
Thus primitives war, but do not punish. Punishment involves
a semi-sympathetic attitude," a diluted hostility, whereas the simple
savage knows but two extremes, community and estrangement.
Thus punishment exists only in a society which has become com-
paratively complex and developed varying degrees of fellow-
feeling.
2 1
"Wergeld, blood feud, and other primitive institutions were
manifestly not punishments,"-22 but a feature of a state of decentral-
ization which may be described as intertribal anarchy, analogous to
the international anarchy of today. The analogy is made more vivid
by the present controversy over international sanctions, moral and
legal; without one or the other there can be no international crime
in either sense.
The sociological accommodation from which this increased com-
plexity in primitive society results is thus seen to be of two sorts:
(1) co-operation on more or less equal terms, and (2) some form
of slavery. There is considerable weight to the opinion that our
industrial civilization savors more strongly of the latter,2 3 and is
more in harmony with the attitudes engendered by such a state of
affairs, in spite of our protestations of democracy. Fascism is a frank
Fichtian withdrawal from these pretensions. At any rate outright
slavery was the predominant social relationship in England until
the twelfth century,24 and subsequent history may be viewed as a
gradual evolutionary modification thereof, still far from complete.
However that may be, the criminal as well as the civil law must
be regarded as a compromise emerging out of a state of conflict, in
other words, a treaty of peace.25 Preceding this there were only the
customs of the isolated tribes,20 the "right,"2 7 uncontradicted folk-
ways.
2 8
20Faris, Ellsworth: OOp. cit., p. 158.
21 Ibid., p. 160.
22Maitland: "The Criminal Liability of the Hundred," Collected Papers, I,
p. 217.
23 Ward, Lester F.: Evolution of Social Structures. (Formative Influences of
Legal Development, III, Ch. 21, p. 506.)
24Pollock and Maitland: History of English Law, I, p. 35, pp. 415-6.
25Merkel, Adolph: The Compromise Nature of Law. (Formative Influences
of Legal Development, Ch. 17, See. 2, p. 448.)
26 Carter, J. C.: Law, Its Origin, Growth and Function, pp. 18-19.
27 Gray, J. C.: The Nature and Sources of the Law. (Select Essays in Anglo-
American Legal History, I, pp. 303-6.)
28 Sumner, J. G.: Folkways, passim.
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The first step then in the evolution of criminal law is the hostile
and harsh contact of one tribe with another in primitive economic
competition. There would naturally be bloodshed, resulting, for
example, from a dispute over the carcass of a deer. The body of the
losing participant is left at the place of dispute, to be found by his
kinsmen, and a tribal war thus precipitated.29  The attitude, of the
tribesmen was undoubtedly free from serious concern about "right."
They were incapable of even the thought, "right or wrong, my
tribe." The battle was to the strong, but later, of course, to the
cunning. 0
Those tribes, however, which continued on this basis, were
certain to weaken themselves, and to be subjugated by those pos-
sessing a calmer spirit. The ones capable of alliance and conquest
would inevitably prevail. And with alliance and conquest, measure-
ment of retaliation for injury, as between allies or castes, was essen-
tial to such accommodation. Hence the blood-feud, and the still
familiar principle of one life for one life, and only one eye for one
eye, ' with the necessity for an institution in the nature of a tribunal
29 Keller, F. A.: Experimental Sociology, p. 227.
30Bagehot, Walter: The Use of Conflict. (Formative Influences of Legal
Development, Ill, Ch. 18, p. 456.)
"'There is,' it has been said, 'hardly any exaggerating the difference
between civilized and uncivilized man; it is greater than the difference between
a tame and a wild animal,' because man can improve more. But the difference
at first was gained in much the same way. The taming of animals as it now
goes on among savage nations, and as travellers who have seen it describe
it, is a kind of selection. The most wild are killed when food is wanted, and
the most tame and easy to manage kept, because they are more agreeable to
human indolence, and so the keeper likes them best. . . . Man, being the
strongest of all animals, differs from the rest; he was obliged to be his own
domesticator; he had to tame himself. And the way in which it happened
was that the most obedient, the tamest, tribes are, at the first stage in the real
struggle for life, the strongest and the conquerors. All are very wild then;
the animal vigor, the savage virtue, of the race has died out of none, and all
have enough of it. But what makes one tribe--one incipient tribe, one bit of a
tribe-to differ from another is their relative faculty of coherence. The slightest
symptom of legal development, the least indication of a military bond, is then
enough to.turn the scale. The compact tribes win, and the compact tribes are
the tamest. Civilization begins, because the beginning of civilization is a mili-
tary advantage.
"Probably if we had historic records of the ante-historic ages-if some
superhuman power had set down the thoughts and the actions of men ages
before they could set them down for themselves-we should know that this
first in civilization was the hardest step. All the absolutely incoherent men-
all the 'Cyclopes'-have been cleared away long before there was an authentic
account of them. And the least coherent only remain in the 'protected' parts
of the world, as we may call them ....
31 Cherry, Richard: Primitive Criminal Law. (Prim. and Anc. Legal Instits.,
p. 122.) Hobhouse, L. T.: Morals in Evolution. (Prim. and Anc. Legal Instits.,
p. 133.) Jenks, Edward: A Short History of English Law, p. 7. Pike, L. 0.:' Op.
cit., p. 86.
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to do the measuring_2 just as between twentieth century nations.
3
1
It was, indeed, an age of personal violence,3 in view of which the
somewhat orderly trial by battle can be appreciated as a distinct
advance toward world brotherhood. 3 That self-help persisted for
centuries as a recognized mode of redress" testifies to the proposi-
tion that rules of conduct are born in the agony of travail.3
During the first attempt at some sort of intertribal organization
the new supertribal sanction would naturally be weak, and many
persons nominally members of such organization would as naturally
tend to continue in their habit of destroying each other without
formality, and at wholesale instead of according to some measure-
ment,38 a situation again comparable to modern nationalism. The
problem of enforcement thus became important, and extremely
difficult in the absence of a non-partisan police force of some kind.
Outlawry was therefore an attractive device, about the only one
available.3 9 Religious institutions, by the way, have frequently used
this same tool, calling it excommunication, and because of the same
embarrassment, to wit, the lack of more direct means. The most
that can be said for outlawry is that it was a beginning, and better
than no sanction at all, though ineffective in proportion to the per-
sistent prevalence of ancient attachment to narrow tribal loyalties.
Tribocentrism, though its complexion has changed, is even now not
extinct by far in the most highly organized civilizations. Candidates
for office who appeal to various special interests among their con-
stituents, whether by outright vote-purchase, political jobbery, or
protective tariffs, usually fare very well at the polls. Moreover the
classic prayer: "God bless me and my wife. my son John and his
wife-us four and no more," expresses a breadth of vision not much
more limited than that of millions of our contemporaries.
The development of a super-tribal unit of society, whether by
conquest or alliance, shows as one of its most important results,--
and, evolutionally, as a very significant cause or excuse also,-an
increasing consciousness of the need of measured redress to replace
the impromptu and extravagant retaliation and counter-retsliation
32 Hobhouse, L. T.: Op. cit., p. 145.
33Faris, Ellsworth: Op. cit., p. 159.
34 Pike, L. 0.: Op. cit., pp. 79, 85, 88, 90, 98.
35Pollock and Maitland: History of English Law, I, p. 50.
36 Ibid., II, p. 574.
3
T Von Jhering, Rudolph: The Struggle for Law. (Formative Influences of
Legal Development, HI, p. 447.)
38 Pollock and Maitland: Opt. cit., II, p. 450.
3s Ibid., II, pp. 449-50.
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of the feud.40 Thus the early kings, acting as judges, gradually
came to a cataloguing of such activities as were injurious to the
welfare of the community, or of that portion of it which was recog-
nized as important to those in power; such a catalogue must
recognize that there are various degrees of gravity among such
offenses, and indicate corresponding degrees in the respective pen-
alties to be exacted.4
Criminal law has thus come into being. But in these early days
of development the distinctions are purely objective, the severity
or lightness of the punishment depending entirely upon the sup-
posed importance of the injury, and not at all upon the state of
mind of the one doing the damage. 42
"What is the measure of culpability that ancient law endeavors to
maintain? Is it high, is it low? Do we start with the notion that a man
is only answerable for those results of his actions that he has intended,
and then gradually admit that he is sometimes liable for harm that he
did not intend, or, on the other hand, do we begin with a rigid principle
which charges him with all the evil that he has done, and then do we
accept first one and then another mitigation of this rule? There seems
to be now little room for doubt that of these two answers the second is
the truer. Law in its earliest days tries to make men answer for all the
ills of an obvious kind that their deeds bring upon their fellows."
Psychological nuances were entirely too subtle, and any Wood-
row Wilson proclaiming them must have been set down as hopelessly
academic and impractical. There was no such thing, in the law, as
accidental injury. 3 Possession of stolen property was conclusive
of liability. Murder and manslaughter as now distinguished were
identical. 44 Such strictness and simplicity had of course the virtue
of that certainty4 5 so highly esteemed by business men, and many
years of intellectual growth were necessary before its less attractive
but correlative attribute,-formalism,-should become apparent.
The law of deodand is part and parcel of this stage of legal
40 Pound, Roscoe: The End of Law, 27 Harv. L. R., p. 198.
41 Davies, W. W.: The Code of Hammurabi. (Sources of Anc. and Prim. Law,
p. 387.) Powell, J. W.: Wyandot Government. (Sources of Anc. and Prim. Law,
pp. 287-8.) Pike, L. 0.: Op. cit., I, p. 41.
42 Pollock and Maitland: Op. cit., U, p. 470-1. See abo Thorpe, Benjamin:
King Aethelbirht's Dooms. (Sources of Anc. and Prim. Law, p. 515.) Henderson,
E. F.: The Lex Salica. (Sources of Anc. and Prim. Law, p. 505.) Pound, Roscoe:
The End of Law, 27 Harv. L. R., p. 204.
43Owen, A: Laws of Howell Dda. (Sources of Anc. and Prim. Law, p. 546.)
Pollock, J. F.: Anglo-Saxon Law. (Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal
History, I, 102-3.) Pollock and Maitland: Op. cit., I, p. 55.
"Pike, L. 0.: Op. cit., I, p. 469.
45 Pound, Roscoe: The End of Law, 27 Harv. L. R., p. 207.
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development, but more strikingly ridiculous, even to those of us
who break in pieces recalcitrant golf-clubs. Animals and imple-
ments were favored with the honor of solemn destruction 0 for
their misdeeds: 4
7
"The deodand may warn us that in ancient criminal law there was a
sacred element which Christianity could not wholly suppress, especially
when what otherwise might have been esteemed a heathenry was in
harmony with some of those strange old dooms that lie imbedded in
the holy books of the Christians.
Science had hardly begun to dispel the fog obscuring the
phenomena of existence. A superstitious answer to life's terrifying
uncertainties was therefore necessary to relieve the intolerable
tension of a psychic vacuum."
From the orderly classification of crimes and measured retalia-
tion, the next step is the substitution of money payments,49 an im-
provement that cannot be over-estimated from the economic point
of view. Here we have an early inkling of the difficult concept that
two wrongs do not make a right. And while the wer compensated
the victim the kinglet could gain revenue by means of the wite,
imposed as a sort of disciplinary surtax' ° The blood feud was thus
gradually superseded. 5
46 Hobhouse, L. T.: Op. cit., p. 143.
47 Pollock and Maitland: Op. cit., II, pp. 474-5.
(p. 475n) "Y. B. 7 Edw. IV. 2 (Pasch. pl. 2). So Hale, P. C., i. 429, speaking
of witchcraft: 'It cannot come under the judgment of felony, because no
external act of violence was offered whereof the common law can take notice,
and secret things belong to God.'
48 Levitt, Albert: Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 Ill. L. R., p. 128.
40 Cherry, Richard: Primitive Criminal Law. (Prim. and Anc. Legal Instits.,
p. 124.) Hobhouse, L. T.: Op. cit., p. 135. Pollock and Maitland: Op. cit., I,
pp 47, 52.
5o Ibid., I, p. 48,-
"We find the public and private aspects of injurious acts pretty clearly
distinguished by the Anglo-Saxon terms. Wer, as we have said, is the value
set on a man's life, increasing with his rank. For many purposes it could be
a burden as well as a benefit; the amount of a man's own wer was often the
measure of the fine to be paia for his offenses against public order. Wite is
the usual word for a penal fine payable to the king or to some other public
authority. Bot (the modem German Busse) is a more general word, including
compensation of any kind. Some of the gravest offenses especially against the
king and his peace, are said to be botless, 'bootless,' that is, and the offender
is not entitled to redeem himself at all, and is at the king's mercy. The dis-
tinction between wer and wite must be very ancient."
51 Ibid., 11, p. 449,--
"A ready recourse to outlawry is, we are told, one of the tests by which the
relative barbarousness of various bodies of ancient law may be measured.
Gradually law learns how to inflict punishment with a discriminating hand.
In this respect some of the Scandinavian codes, though of comparatively recent
date, seem to represent an earlier stage than any to which our Anglo-Saxon
law bears witness; outlawry in them is still the punishment for many even of
the smaller deeds of violence. Among our English forefathers, when they were
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Meanwhile the unity of the tribe or clan continued. The family,
not the individual, was the unit of responsibility52 and paid or re-
ceived the wer. Ownership of land was, by the same token, tribal."
Of individual liberty there was practically none,54 particularly as to
females, who were of course chattels, and bought and sold as such. 55
As life becomes more settled locality becomes significant. It
may be supposed 1hat during the early stages of settling down the
tribe or family and the local community are practically co-extensive,
the emphasis being still upon ancient blood ties as determining the
unit of responsibility.56 This influence has not entirely lost its force
today, but, except in the Orient, it is safe to say that the locality has
come to be more significant at the expense of the criterion of con-
sanguinity.57
So we see the self-sufficient agricultural village, virtually iso-
lated, becoming the unit of we-ness, but without appreciably en-
hancing individualism. When a breach of the lord's peace occurred
within the territorial limits of a village community the apprehending
of the individual culprit was of interest only to the members them-
selves. To the rest of the world the whole community was answer-
able. And where collective responsibility persists, any distinction
between accident and design has little chance of being fostered.5 8 On
the one hand, the substantial interests of the group do not extend
elsewhere, and on the other no observers of the incident in question
except local persons are likely to be available during an investiga-
tion. The effect of making such a distinction would have been to
assure an acquittal on every charge, all witnesses being friendly
to the accused. Reprisals would ensue, with a reversion to private
warfare. Indicia of this closely-knit and persistent group unity are
the frankpledge, the tithing, and the wager of law,59 not to mention
first writing down their customs, outlawry was already reserved for those who
were guilty of the worst crimes."
52 Davis, W. W.: The Code of Hammurabi. (Sources of Anc. and Prim. Law,
p. 409.) Kennedy, C. R.: Oration of Demosthenes. (Sources of Anc. and Prim.
Law, p. 605.)
53 Pike, L. 0.: Op. cit., I, p. 76.
• Ibid., pp. 89-90.
55 Ibid., p. 91.
56 Saibah, J. M.: Fanti Customary Law. (Sources of Anc. and Prim. Law,
p. 328.) Kennedy, C. R.: Orations of Demosthenes. (Sources of Anc. and Prim.
Law, p. 605.)
57 Powell, J. W.: On Regimentation. (Prim. and Anc. Legal Instits., p. 73.)
5s Hobhouse, L. T.: Morals in Evolution. (Prim. and Anc. Legal Instits., pp.
140-3.)
69 Pike, L. 0.: Op. cit., pp. 55-60. Pollock and Maitland: Op. cit., I, pp. 558,
568, 580.
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the traditional rights in common,60 which became so troublesome in
later centuries. In a word, the prevailing criterion of liability ig-
nored not only absence of individual intention but even the absence
of participation.6'
III. The Rise of Psychic Criteria
Those early principles of responsibility are summarized by
Post: 62
"All wrongs are originally violations of rights between one clan
and another. Every wrong done by an individual creates an obligation
for his clan towards that of the injured person. There is thus no doctrine,
in civil wrongs, about intent, negligence, guilt, capacity, voluntariness,
mistake, fear, or the like. The whole point of view of individual mental
states which dominates our modern tort-law (a law essentially of indi-
vidual rights and duties) is alien to primitive law. Each clan is liable to
the other for every injury suffered, whether it be done by adult clan-
members or by women, children, animals, or lifeless objects belonging
to the clan, and whether the wrongdoer be blamable, or be merely the
involuntary tool of external forces."
Wigmore expresses much the same conclusions: 63
"It is easy to understand that the notion of Responsibility for Harm-
ful Results was determined largely by crude primitive instincts of super-
stition,-that our ancestors were satisfied with finding a visible source for
the harm and following out their ideas of justice upon it.
"It must be remembered, moreover, that we are here dealing with a
sentiment characteristic of primitive justice everywhere. It was, beyond
question, universal. It appears not only in the strictly Germanic peoples,
but in the records of all the race-stocks, however mixed, of post-Christian
Europe-the Scandinavian, the Flemish-Dutch, the Celtic, the French,
the Spanish, the Italian, the Slavic, the Hungarian. It is found in earliest
Greece and earliest Rome. It is equally marked in the Semitic races-
Jews and Mohammedans-as well as in their predecessors in Chaldca
and Egypt; and in the totally unrelated Hindus and Chinese, as well as
in the Japanese. And in the primitive tribes still surviving everywhere-
in Africa, Australia, America, and Asia-it is still observable."
As civilization progresses distinctions and gradations of liability
appear, particularly the state of mind of the accused becomes
60 Ibid., I, p. 620.
61 Ibid., II, pp. 529-32.
62 Post, A. H. Die Grundlage des Rechts und die Grundguege seiner Entwick-
elungsgeschichte, see. 39, p. 350.
63 Wigmore, J. H.: Responsibility for Tortious Acts, Its History. (Select
Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, III, pp. 475-8.)
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material. One might attribute this to any one of several significant
phenomena, notably (1) the development of larger social units, (2)
the transformation of predatory bands of fighters into settled agri-
cultural communities, (3) the increase of intercommunication and
commerce, (4) the development of sharp intellectual and moral
sensibilities. A favorite explanation of the predominance of the
mental factor in Anglo-American criminal law has been the intro-
duction of Christianity. The logic of such a thesis is as follows: The
Christian doctrine includes the propositions (A) that a sinful
thought is as blameworthy as a sinful act, and (B) that the salvation
of the soul is of more importance than the welfare of its transitory
earthly vessel. Hence the introduction of Christianity, with its
penances and spiritual purifications, into England 4 served gradually
to wean the population from its harsh objective attitude.
What such particularism overlooks, or at least fails to mention,
is that the same distinctions developed also in other civilizations,
even those antedating the Christian era itself. Devotees of the
Christian theology are wont to think of Jesus as the inventor of
social consciousness and self-abnegation, and the spiritual emphasis
thereby connoted.
The panorama of changing criminal criteria discloses rather that
as mankind gains more and more experience in cooperation, which
is the keystone of social life, there slowly develops the capacity
for a deeper and more comprehensive we-ness, which becomes the
quality of the highest survival value. Two sentences epitomize this:
"In union there is strength," and "Blessed are the meek, for they
shall inherit the earth." From a predatory animal, hunting in small
groups, man evolved, and is evolving, into a sympathetic social
64 Levitt, Albert: Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 Ill. L. R., pp. 128-37.
Holdsworth, W. S.: History of English Law, pp. 53-4. Pike, L. 0.: Op. cit., pp.
49, 55-7. Pollock and Maitland: Op. cit., II, p. 476,-
"Of course the Christian church in her penitential books, which exercised
a not inconsiderable influence on the parallel tariff of wite and bot, laid stress
on the mental elements in sin. Still some of the earliest of these books set up
a very high standard of liability, even in in foro conscientiae, for remote and
unintended harm. This may be due to that nervous horror of blood which
at a later time would prevent an ordained clerk from taking part in a surgical
operation, but is due in part to the example set by temporal law and public
opinion. We receive a shock of surprise when we meet with a maxim that
has troubled our modern lawyers, namely, Reum non facit nisi mens sea, in the
middle of the Leges Henrici among rules which hold a man answerable for all
harm that he does, and not far from the old proverb, Qui inscienter peccat,
scienter emendet. But the borrowed scrap of St. Augustine speaks only of
perjury, and that anyone should ever have thought of charging with perjury
one who swore what he believed to be true, will give us another glimpse into
ancient law."
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being. These other circumstances are only the indicia of the progress
of that evolution. Without some trace of this quality the first petty
chieftains could not have ruled for a day. Without a further growth
of it no kingdoms could have arisen. Similarly Christianity could
never have taken root in England had not the spiritual soil been
already greatly improved. On the other hand historical scholars now
realize that the so-called Christianity of medieval Europe was really
only at best a compromise with the prevalent paganism, a com-
promise in favor of Christianity only insofar as the existing intellec-
tual and moral capacities of the peoples concerned had developed.
It might be added that the disparity, so striking today in the mili-
tant Western world, between the avowed faith and the current
practice, illustrates the same kind of adjustment.
That there is in the growth of psychic criteria for wrongdoing
something far more fundamental than a superimposed religious
dogma is shown by the story of the death of Baldur .
6
"Baldur the beautiful was beloved by all the gods, and Frigga had
exacted an oath from all things-fire, water, stones, trees, and all-not
to harm Baldur; for Baldur had dreamed of his own death. Then the
gods, his safety assured, began in fun to pelt him with stones, clubs, and
battle-axes, and found him indeed invulnerable. But Loki the jealous
was vexed because Baldur was not hurt; and going in disguise to Frigga
he learned that the mistletoe alone had not been sworn, for it seemed too
feeble a plant to do harm. Then Loki went to Hodur, the blind god, who
had been standing apart, for he had nothing to throw. He could not see
to aim, so Loki gave him the mistletoe twig and guided his hand, and
the twig flew, and struck Baldur lifeless. The other gods were for laying
strong hands on the murderer; but they were in a sacred place. And
Hodur fled. And Odin said, 'Now, who will wreak vengeance on Hodur,
and send Baldur's slayer to Hades?' The avenger was Wali, Baldur's
younger brother, who washed not his hands and combed not his hair
until he fulfilled his vengeance and smitten to death the slayer of Baldur."
The commentator adds, "A clearer case of innocence, one would
think, in these days, could hardly be made out; but not so by the
tests of our ancestors." But who can doubt that the teller of the
tale, and every one of his auditors, felt that Loki was the real
villain? The rest of the same mythology is eloquent of the status of
this character. In other words, the story itself shows a dawning
appreciation of the psychic quality of guilt, among people who had
never heard of Christianity.
Now, it is fairly obvious that with the growth of more com-
65 Wigmore, J. H.: Op. cit., p. 483.
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prehensive units of social organization the intensity of unity in each
component group languishes. Necessity is not only the great mother
but in the long run the only nurse. Thus the King's Peace becomes
paramount, while the Lord's peace loses its significance.6 There is
no clearer aspect of the history of English law than the steady
encroachment of the Royal upon the Feudal courts, the much mis-
understood Magna Carta being a temporary move backward, 7 prob-
ably necessitated by a previous forward step made more hastily
than social evolution would justify. When the times had ripened
the independence6 8 of the feudal lords, to preserve which John's
signature to the Great Charter had been compelled, disintegrated.
Coincident with the increasing centralization of political power,
even in its earlier stages, we find distinctions developing, accidental
injury to property sometimes being distinguished before accidental
personal injury.7 0 It is suggested as a reason for this that in a
simple society a greater proportion of the injuries to property would
be of the unintended sort than in the case of personal injuries, where
there could be a reasonable presumption of intent in every case.
Primitive animosity would normally be personal, and direct in
expansion.
As civilization proceeds such broad presumptions, if such they
are, become increasingly unsatisfactory. Tribocentrism, with its
correlative hostility to everything extratribal, decays, and contacts
are more normally friendly. It is no longer reasonably correct to
assume an evil purpose. Hence the exceptions tend to become so
numerous that the general assumption is destroyed and the new
element, the mental state, gains greater and greater significance,
and finds its place in the law.
7 1
The old-fashioned stark absolute, whether based on mental
dullness or reasonable presumption, was nevertheless long a-dying.
As late as the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries an accidental
killer had to obtaih a special pardon from the king,72 and such pro-
cedure was also necessary, in the reign of Henry Ill, on behalf of a
woman who killed in a fit of madness7 3 and of one killing in self
66 Hobhouse, L. T.: Op. cit., p. 146.
6- Beard, Charles and Mary: Rise of American Civilization, I, p. 18.
68 Pollock and Maitland: Op. cit., I, pp. 45-51.
69 Munro, D. C.: The Middle Ages, p. 267.
70 Dugmore, H. H.: Kafir Laws and Customs. (Sources of Ant. and Prim.
Law, pp. 319-20.)
71 Levitt, Albert: Op. cit., p. 120. Pollock and Maitland: Op. cit., U, p. 476n.
Select Pleas of the Crown. (Seldon Society) p. 120.
7233 Yale L. J., p. 528.
73 Pollock and Maitland: Op. cit., II, p. 480.
CRIMINAL GUILT 843
defense.7' Moreover, the right of the decedent's kinsmen to com-
pensation persisted even against one pardoned by the king, that is,
excused from criminal liability.-- This anomaly curiously resembles
the modern workmen's compensation statutory liabilities.
At any rate degrees of blame are recognized in the late Anglo-
Saxon dooms. 7 6 The Norman conquest unquestionably further stim-
ulated the development of distinctions, in its introduction of politi-
cal unity on a larger scale and of a more durable character "than
theretofore experienced in England. The King's Peace began for
the first time to assume permanent significance and force. The real
national development of England may be said to have begun, and
with it, as already pointed out, broader sympathies and attitudes,
involving more accurate rules of conduct. Added to this there was
the always important factor of continued and close contact with a
different culture. It is not surprising that Roman law began to
play a part in English legal evolution.7
All along, the interaction of the various factors involved, namely
(1) broadening political and economic cooperation, (2) peaceful
intercommunication of ideas, (3) historical records, (4) the doc-
trines of Christianity, (5) economic individualism, (6) intellectual
development, and (7) the increase of wealth, combine in a growth
that is at the same time steady and self-accelerating. Out of this
complexity emerged a criminal law calculated to respond at least
roughly to a tremendously increased variety of recognized shades
of culpability.
To trace all these intertwining threads-of influence would re-
quire almost infinite learning and exposition, and historians accord-
ing to their respective points of emphasis-legal, political, religious,
economic, etc.-have of necessity elided the twilight zones of their
particular interests, merely paying their respects to the others in
passing. 8
It goes without saying that this development, while on the
whole a steady and continuous -unfolding, was far from smooth.
Entrenched habits of mind have hardly ever been known to yield
without a bitter struggle. Nor is the natural predacity of the savage
easily exorcised, requiring, rather millenia of evolution for its elimi-
nation, and it is surely no bombast to remark that the story is writ-
74 Ibid., II, p. 484.
75 Ibid., I, p. 53.
76 Ibid., I, p. 53.
77 Ibid., II, p. 477.
78 Holdsworth, W. S.: Op. cit., H-VIII.
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ten in blood. The final chapter of this process seems to be yet far
in the future.
From the Norman invasion of England until the nineteenth
century a progressive refining of the principles of liability evolved.
"The main principle of the earlier law is that an act causing physical
damage must, in the interests of peace, be paid for."79 By the time
of Henry I (1100 A. D.) the duty to compensate still exists, even
in cases of accident and self-defense. A man acts at his peril to
that extent. But the crumbling process has begun. The general rule
at this time shows at least two important modifications, namely the
recognition of the irresponsibility of (1) lunatics and (2) young
children. 0 During this reign the celebrated maxim, "reum non
facit nisi mens rea" was coined, applied then to the crime of perjury,
of all crimes the one most obviously involving an attitude of mind,8 '
and although still creating liability to compensate the injured, the
accidental wrong is emendable.8 2 The king's power to pardon prob-
ably provided equity, of a sort, in cases where the absence of legal
distinctions had become most glaringly absurd: 
8 3
"When in the following period these more advanced ideas gain
greater influence, when all serious crime comes to be regarded as an
offense against the king, the royal power to pardon will help to reconcile
the new ideas with the old. The king, it is true, will not be able to prevent
the injured man or his kin from prosecuting an appeal for hot or wer
upon the old principles. But when hot and wer become obsolete, when
crimes which call for punishment become differentiated from torts for
which damage can be obtained, the ideas which ground criminal liability
upon moral delinquency will have freer play-so much free play, in fact,
as is consistent with political expediency."
From the accession of Henry II (1154) until the death of Brac-
ton (1268) the centralization of authority, in spite of civil war and
other indicia of political unrest normally attending a changing social
order proceeded apace. We see the Royal courts gaining in power
and prestige, with the correlaive decline of local authority. Feudal-
ism is on the wane. The relation of the king to the individual
subjects becomes direct. The King's Peace becomes transcendant,
and public policy a realm-wide matter. The doctrines of Christianity
take firmer root. The people are more capable of appreciating the
-9 Ibid., II, p. 51.
8o Leg. Henr., 59, 20, 78, 6, 7.
81 Ibid., 5, 28.
82 Ibid., 90, 11.
s3 Holdsworth, W. S.: Op. cit., 1H, p. 52.
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refinements of the Roman law. All these influences tend to make
responsibilities more and more a personal affair.84
It is not surprising that the rules relating to criminal liability
show a great advance:85
"Now a consideration of what guilt is morally imputable will lead
us to make refined distinctions-to attach, for instance, some slight
guilt to a man who kills by mischance, though we should not dream of
holding him guilty of murder.... In those days to hold a man responsible
for killing was to hold him liable for murder. The kinds of homicide
and the degrees of punishment are not yet nicely adjusted. But, from
another point of view, the insistence upon the element of moral guilt,
which in the eyes of the canonists varied the penance to be imposed,
helped to overthrow the older system."
This change of attitude, of which Bracton was the outstandingly
articulate prophet, became manifest during the reign of Edward I
(1216-1272). The practice of pardoning children under seven who
have committed a felony becomes an established rule, and rising
by the same process are the defenses of lunacy, misadventure, and
self-defense, although there is not yet any distinct legal classifica-
tion. 6 Likewise in theft, the animus juranci is coming to be con-
sidered an element of the offense, as Bracton had been insisting it
should, according to the canon law, and these doctrines were to be
accepted as the civilization grew up to them.
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the distinctions be-
tween wilful murder, on the one hand, and accidental, justifiable, and
in self-defense, on the other, are definitely enunciated. Other fel-
onies, such as rape, burglary, arson, and robbery, depend upon wil-
fulness. The law has left far behind the old rules which look merely
at the result and neglect the intent.
Various shades of moral guilt in homicide had by that time
found their way into the law, as that between negligent injury and
that resulting from premeditated malice 8 7 the latter gradually com-
ing to be designated by the name of murder, the old word for secret
killing, peculiarly odious to the forthright Anglo-Saxons of preced-
ing centuries.
Suicide came to be a felony during the fourteenth century.88
84 Jenks, Edward: Edward I, the English Justinian, pp. 142-5.
85 Holdsworth, W. S,: Op. cit., H, p. 259. 33 Yale L. J., p. 528.
s Holdsworth, W. S.: Op. cit., II, p. 359.
87 Fitzherbert: Abridgement, Cor. Pl. 284.
88 Ibid.. Cor. PL 301.
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This innovation derives not only from the religious emphasis upon
the importance of the soul, but from at least two other aspects of
current social evolution, the public policy of discouraging a reduc-
tion of the population, and the interest of the Crown in forfeitures.
It is noteworthy that in 1397 there was enacted a statute making
it treason to "compass the king's death or deposition."8 9 Thus an
intent alone was made a crime, though an overt act be absent."
In general, however, even where a felony was so far intended as to
be unsuccessfully attempted, it was not a felony. 91 Even today, as
everyone knows, this distinction survives in the lesser punishment
to the mere attempter.
Feudal attitudes survived to the extent that each individual was
considered as having a permanent status, and he could not legally
alter it, even in the towns. The current expression, "stadtluft ist
frei," was a comparative. That different classes of society should
have special privileges was a matter of course. Political equality
was not even an ideal, and that it was not is certainly no matter for
surprise. Social evolution had not proceeded far enough, for a
multitude of inseparable reasons already discussed.
On through the sixteenth century the conditions of criminal
liability continued to become more precise. The law was feeling its
way toward classification."2 The work of discriminating between
one or another sort of homicide furnishes a clear picture of this.
The old excuses requiring royal pardons came to be recognizable
classes, receiving pardons customarily, and finally to be enunciated
in positive law, as in the statute exonerating from forfeiture of
goods those who killed defending themselves from robbery, arson,
and burglary. 3 Misadventure9 4 and self-defense 5 were recognized
excuses by the year 1500.
To hold one criminally liable for damage done by his animals
his knowledge of the animals' tendency must be shown."" A child
under fourteen was protected by a presumption of incapacity to
89 St. 21 Richard I, co. 3 and 4.
9o Holdsworth, W. S.: Op. cit., H, p. 450.
91 Ibid., III, p. 311.
92 But see Fitzherbert Abridgement: Cor. P1. 383 (1322), where an attempt to
murder was punished as if accomplished.
93 St. 24 Henry VIHI, co. 5.
94 Year Book 6, Edward IV, Mich. pl. 18.
95 Year Book 11, Henry VII, Pasch. pl. 14.
96 Fitzherbert: Abridgement, Cor. Pl. 311.
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commit a felony.9 7 Madness at the time of committing the act be-
came a lawful excuse.98
By the beginning of the seventeenth century medieval feudal-
ism was gone from England,90 and nationality had taken its place.
The increasing contacts of commerce and communication, tremen-
dously enhanced by the increase of wealth and by the spread of
information through the printing press, released in large measure
the opportunities for individual activity and development. An
increasingly large proportion of the population found itself free
of the old-fashioned restraints of permanent status and in a position
to exercise initiative under the centralized government of the
realm.100 New alignments of interests and social groups attained
importance and influence, property and tools of new kinds came into
use, and relationships and rights became more and more complex.
Modern civilization seemed to leap forward. The criminal law re-
flected this development most obviously in a great growth in the
list of crimes and their graduations,' but no less truly in the in-
creased recognition of distinctions and degrees of culpability. The
old principles continued to be elaborated, and the rules deduced
from them to become more definite and refined in their distinc-
tions.'0 2 The doctrine of attempt could not longer be ignored, and
the guilt of those who chanced to be thwarted in their harmful
designs became legally recognized and punishable.
03
Thus in the year 1700 the rules of criminal liability had by
statute and precedent reached a high degree of refinement, following
apace contemporary social processes--economic, intellectual, poli-
97 Year Book 3, Henry VII, -il. pl. 4.
08 Year Book 21, Henry VII, Mich. pl. 16.
99 Pike, L. 0.: Op. cit., I, p. 383.
100 Holdsworth, W. S.: Op. cit., IV, p. 402.
1o Ibid., VI, p. 399 ff.
102Ibid., VI, p. 629 ff.,--
"The doctrine of constructive treason was developed; the line was drawn
more clearly between murder and manslaughter; new illustrations were af-
forded of the narrowness of the crime of larceny at common law; the scope of
burglary and robbery was more clearly explained; and the necessary ingredi-
ents of such crimes as riot, perjury, and bigamy were illustrated. It was a
reckless age-politically and morally-so that crimes of violence were common.
Also it was an age of commercial expansion, so that various new forms of
fraudulent dealing needed suppression. For these reasons the criminal law
developed with some rapidity.
(VIII, pp. 302-4) "The readiness with which all classes resorted to lethal
weapons to assert their rights, or to avenge any insult real or fancied, gave
abundant opportunity for elaborating the distinctions between the various kinds
of homicide, and, in particular, the distinctions between murder and man-
slaughter."
103 Ibid., V, p. 201.
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tical, and religious. The requirement of personal culpability had
become firmly fixed as a principle of criminal liability.
The state of mind necessary for guilt in different classes of
crime is seen to vary.1"" The guilty intent required for murder is
different from that required for larceny. 1°" And due to the still-
present difficulty of proving intent, as "the devil himself knoweth
not the thought of man," certain overt acts are held to be conclusive
of intent. The doctrine of "substituted intent" was also found nec-
essary, as "when one ompasseth to kill, wound, or beat another, and
doth it sedato animo, though it be intended against one, it shall be
extended towards another."'10 6 Intent to commit one felony came
for similar reasons of public policy to be considered sufficient intent
to support criminal liability where other damage resulted, though by
accident, from the situation thus guiltily created. Thus unintended
killing resulting from the doing of another unlawful act came to be
murder, and punishable as such.107 If, however, the intended act
happened to be of a not very serious unlawfulness, a resultant acci-
dental death was placed in the category of manslaughter. Here we
see the recognition of various degrees between extreme guilt and
complete innocence, a notable refinement. Similarly, an unpre-
meditated killing in a sudden quarrel came to be placed in this inter-
mediate class.
Guilty intent came to be negatived in five kinds of cases in all,
namely, those of (1) reasonable inadvertence, (2) self-defense, (3)
extreme infancy, (4) insanity, and (5) public necessity. Drunken-
ness, if caused by other parties, became a defense also, or at least
recognized as a mitigating circumstance. And a wife could excuse
herself as having been coerced by her husband. In that case the
husband became the guilty party, his presence even causing a pre-
sumption of coercion.
"In these various ways the law, starting from the idea that a mens
rea or element of moral guilt is a necessary foundation of criminal lia-
bility, has so defined and elaborated that idea in reference to various
sorts of crimes that it has come to connote very many different shades
of guilt in different connections. But, though mens rea has thus come
to be a very technical conception with different technical meanings in
different contexts, it has never wholly lost its natural meaning; and be-
cause its natural meaning has never been wholly lost sight of, the neces-
sity for its presence, in some form, has supplied the principle upon which
104 Ibid., VIII, p. 434.
105 De Pace: Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History, VII, p. 378.
106 Holloway's Case (1629), Cro. Car. 131. 20 Mich. L. R., p. 234.
107 Coke: Third Institute, p. 56.
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many of the circumstances which will negative criminal liability are
based. These, in their turn, have been so developed that they have be-
come the foundation of different bodies of technical doctrine; and in these
ways a large part of our modern criminal law was developed."108
IV. Guilt in the Light of Sociology
Looking at the criminal law as it stood in England at the begin-
ning of the eighteenth century one sees clearly that by that time
the simple old objective test of liability had been completely super-
seded by the subjective or psychic test. To be sure, it had not
reached the point where a man was held guilty of a crime by evil
thought alone, but the evil state of mind was essential. The maxim,
"reum non facit nisi mens rea," became the guiding principle of
criminal jurisprudence, and still is.1"9 That date (1700) is therefore
a reasonably convenient point at which to compare the ancient and
the modern picture. The contrast is of course obvious, and is ex-
plained by the enormous social development intervening. Instead
of the hundreds of small and virtually independent political units of
pre-Norman England there has risen a single nation, knit together
by millions of threads of cooperative interest among its citizens.
Superstition has largely made way for social philosophy.110 "We"
is a word taking in millions instead of a handful. The avowed pur-
pose of criminal law now is to safeguard this huge society, rather
than to recompense an injured family. Instead of crude and rigid
rules of thumb there is an elaborate refinement of distinctions in
the law generally as well as in the criminal branch. Instead of trial
by mob, by duel, and by boiling kettle, there is an intricate and
careful procedure for determining the facts. Instead of unbending
hereditary class distinctions there is a large measure of freedom and
individual initiative,"' culminating in the economic doctrine of
laissez-faire. Society is dynamic rather than static. Utter ignorance
has given way to widespread literacy and comparative enlighten-
ment, while the supremacy of force has been greatly moderated by
the power of intelligence. Peace rather than war is regarded as the
normal state of affairs. Society emphasizes constructive rather than
108 Holdsworth, W. S.: Op. cit., VIII, p. 447.
109 Holland, T. E.: Jurisprudence, p. 381. Clark, A. J.: Analysis of Criminal
Liability, pp. 109, 112, 152, 172. Holmes, 0. W.: The Common Law, pp. 47, 50, 75.
Austin, John: Jurisprudence, I, p. 488; II, pp. 683, 695, 709. May, John W.: The
Law of Crime (3d ed.), pp. 27 ff.
11o Pike, L. 0: Op. cit., IT, p. 490. Abrams, et at. v. U. S., 250 U. S. 616, at p.
624 (Holmes, J.).
"'l Pike, L. 0.: Op. cit., II, p. 563.
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destructive activity. Cooperation has largely succeeded conflict and
mere accommodation. Instead of the supreme rule of prejudice
there now may be found tolerance and scholarly investigation. Sym-
pathy is admired more, and callousness less. Impatience is tem-
pered by more perspective. All these fruits are far short of ripe-
ness, but the difference is none the less clear, all along the line,
sufficiently clear to indicate mutual correlation.
The extremity reached in the eighteenth century in individual-
ism, marked by the economic and political doctrine of laissez-faire
on the one hand, and the philosophic principle of free-will on the
other, is in the nature of a climax. It would seem that a prerequi-
site to such liberation was the first establishment of the principle of
nationalism. The restraints of locality and status were sloughed
off, and the released reservoirs of individual initiative effected
tremendous economic gains.
Nevertheless it should be remembered that it had once been the
recognized duty of the lord to protect his vassal, and of the master
to feed and house his slave. What is gained in liberty is often lost
in security, and the abuses of the Spencerian philosophy have made
it apparent to increasing numbers that individualism may provide
so little of the latter that the former is unavailable. Such is the
paradox of liberation, under the operation of the truism of "to him
that hath." The shortcomings of current human nature seem to
lead only from one form of regimentation to another.
That the criminal law is too narrowly individualistic in its pres-
ent principles has become increasingly apparent during the past two
centuries. Before long it was observed, for example, that the doc-
trine of mens rea could not apply to the modern business corpora-
tion,1 2 and the definition of culpability therefore had to be modified,
both in tort and crime, by statutory changes. There have been
enacted many statutes imposing not only tort liability without
fault 1 3 but also establishing certain acts as crimes without regard
to the mental factor.' 4 Such tendencies call to mind Maine's cele-
brated observation that the progress of human relationships is from
status to contract, and seem to contradict it. It is interesting to
speculate how much more emphatic this reaction, ff reaction it is,
112 Lee, F. P.: Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 Columbia L. R., pp. 1, 18L
Edgerton, H. W.: Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 26 Yale L. J., p. 827.
113 15 Harv. L. R., p. 235; 33 Harv. L. R., p. 542. Street, D. F.: Foundations of
Legal Liability. Wigmore, J. H.: Responsibility for Tortious Acts, 7 Harv. L. R.,
pp. 315, 383, 441.
114 Salmond, J.: Jurisprudence, pp. 323, 332. Holmes, 0. W.: Opt. cit., p. 54.
24 Mich. L. R., p. 304; 30 Yale L. J., p. 762.
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might have been in the two hundred years just past if during that
time there had been no trek of surplus populations into new and
unsettled regions. Present social tensions are attributed in large
part to the cessation of such activity, which alleviated the pressure,
but thereby merely postponed the necessity of a program of perma-
nent adjustment. Now a less individualistic philosophy seems to be
a pressing necessity.
Since 1700 there has been evident a continuance of the process
of increasing social consciousness. Adaptability and breadth of out-
look have improved, together with an enlargement of sympathy,
fostered particularly by convenience of communication and the em-
phasis upon secondary group organization. To state it in another
way, people have become emotionally more sentitive and intellec-
tually more scientific. On this account there is a greater proportion
of those capable of sympathizing with conditions that are not part
of their own immediate experience, and at the same time willing to
inquire closely into sources. The strictly modern ideals of world
peace and social equality are notable aspects of such development.
In the field of crime there has been during the last few years a
veritable army of men and women who, deploring the prevalence of
criminal behavior, have earnestly inquired concerning it, and en-
deavored to determine its deeper significance. To such people the
legal investigation of the criminal's intent seems woefully superficial
and inadequate. Hence the enormous amount of comment on this
subject in books, magazine articles, and lectures, indicating every
conceivable point of view, and in general agreement only on the
negative proposition that the existing treatment of crime is not satis-
factory. A mere list of these contributions fills a volume of 635
pages," 5 with 25 or more titles per page. Here, then, is a clamor of
15,825 voices. The words of the advertising sloganeer are appro-
priate: "Such popularity must be deserved."
And what do these writers reveal, or attempt to reveal as fac-
tors in criminal behavior? Here are some of the subtitles under
which the material is grouped: The Physical Environment; Her-
edity; Physical Defects; Mental Abnormalities; Economic Factors;
Alcoholism; Drugs; Civilization and Crime; Crime as a Social Heri-
tage in Groups and Families; Religion and Crime; Social Conditions;
Cultural Conflicts; Home Conditions; The Press and the Theatre;
Delinquency and Spare Time; Defective Administration of Criminal
Justice; Influence of the War.
115Kuhlman: Guide to Material on Crime and Criminal Justice.
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To analyze this mass of material is practically impossible. Some
of the significant contributions may be briefly mentioned. Beccaria,
writing in 1778, expressed a philosophic sympathy for the criminal,
emphasizing the economic factor,1" 6 and protested eloquently against
capital punishment. L. 0. Pike, in 1873, noted extremes of wealth
and poverty as a cause of crime,"7 also a correlation between in-
creases in the forms of property and increases in capital crimes,"'
inherited tendencies, 1 9 the background of moral attitudes, 20 the
correlation of immigration and crime,1 2' insanity 122 and drunken-
ness.123 Lombroso during the latter part of the nineteenth century
carried on researches attempting to correlate criminality with cer-
tain physical proportions, and though his hypothesis was afterwards
shown to be false he may be said to have introduced the modern
scientific method of investigation into this field. Gabriel Tarde de-
veloped the theory of socio-psychological maladjustments as the
source of criminal behavior, while W. A. Bonger expounded the
doctrine of economic determinism, both being, like Lombroso, par-
ticularists. Later Ferri recognized the narrowness of such explana-
tions, ' 4 as did Healy, though the latter laid greater stress upon
sociological factors.
1 5
Goring endeavored to correlate criminality negatively with in-
telligence,126 , but Murchison 1 7 and others effectively repudiated the
validity of this type of particularism. The investigations of Cotton
supporting the hypothesis that irregularities of conduct are traceable
116 Beccaria, Marquis of Milan: Essay on Crimes and Punishment, p. 120,-
"I am sensible that to develop the sentiments of one's heart is an art which
only education can teach, but although a villain may not be able to give a
clear account of his principles, they nevertheless influence his conduct. He
reasons thus: 'What are these laws, that I am bound to respect, which make
so great a difference between me and the rich man? He refuses me the farth-
ing I ask of him, and excuses himself by bidding me to have recourse to labor
with which he is unacquainted. Who made these laws? The rich and the
great, who never deigned to visit the miserable hut of the poor; who have never
seen him dividing a piece of mouldy bread, amidst the cries of his famished
children and the tears of his wife. Let us break these ties, fatal to the greatest
part of mankind, and only useful to a few indolent tyrants."'
117 Pike, L. 0.: Op. cit., IH, p. 412.
118 Ibid., I, p. 447.
19 Ibid., II, pp. 494, 667.
120 Ibid., II, pp. 495-6.
121 Ibid., II, p. 517.
1221 Ibid., U, p. 580.
2'Ibid., U, p. 587.
124Ferri, E.: Criminal Sociology, Ch. 2, p. 51.
125 Healey, Wm.: The Individual Delinquent, p. 310.
12c Goring, Chas.: The English Convict.
127 Murchison, C.: Criminal Intelligence.
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to physical defects212 - have also been shown inconclusive. 129 On the
whole, the sociological explanation has stood out as the most ra-
tional, due regard being had to other factors. The conclusions of
such notable scholars as Burgess, 3 ', Sutherland,', Park,132 Gil-
lin,'13 Pound,"' Van Waters,"'3 Darrow,"30 Ogburn,'
37 Parmelee,131
and Munsterburg, 139 all bear this unmistakable emphasis.
Even as the scope and refinement of current judicial practices
in the determination of guilt make the blunt simplicity of primitive
tribunals seem childish, almost equally so are their own solen de-
terminations made #o seem when viewed in the light of the above
investigations. On the other hand, legislators and judges may well
be excused from attempting to extend the research incident to a
criminal trial so far as to include this welter of relevancies. The
"trial" would tend to resolve into an exhaustive appraisal of society
itself. That even the present scope of the legal inquiry is too com-
plicated is shown by the increasing use of the expert witness and
administrative agencies.14°
For this reason the idea of further developing the legal defini-
tion of guilt along the same line as its past development, namely,
refinement, qualification, and definition of extenuations, can hardly
be tolerated. What can be, and in fact generally is, suggested by
non-legalistic students of the subject is a distinct change of attitude
away from the individualistic attitude toward the criminal. Happily
some of the recent innovations in the criminal law are along this
line.
Notable among such changes are the indeterminate sentence, the
habitual criminal provision, and the lessening of capital puhishment,
as well as the reform of prison practices and the institution of the
juvenile court. The tendency seems to be somewhat away from
128 Cotton, H. A.: The Relation of Physical Defect to Abnormal Conduct.
(Amer. Pris. Assoc. Proc., p. 177.)
129 Thomas, W. I. and D. S.: The Child in America.
130 Burgess, E. W.: Study of the Delinquent as a Person.
131 Sutherland, E. H.: Criminology.
132 Park, Robt. E., et al.: The City.
133 Gillin, John L.: Criminology and Penology.
134 Pound, Roscoe: Criminal Justice in America.
135 Van Waters, Miram: Youth in Conflict.
136 Darrow, Clarence: Crime, Its Cause and Treatment.
137 Ogburn, W. F.: Social Change, p. 200.
138 Parmelee, Maurice: Anthropology and Sociology in Relation to Criminal
Procedure, pp. 408-9.
139 Munsterburg, Hugo: On the Witness Stand, pp. 10, 231 ff.
140 Pound, Roscoe: The Future of the Criminal Law, 21 Columbia L. R., p. 1.
854 J. J. M. SCANDERFI]
"organized revenge" 4 1 toward a more enlightened policy of "malice
toward none," although the former attitude is still very vigorous.'42
The problem of crime may be stated basically as follows: The
interest of the community as a whole must be protected from acts
by individuals or groups which are adverse to that interest, how-
ever useful or profitable such acts may be to the participants. In
other words, anti-social activity, the antithesis of cooperation, should
be eradicated.
The traditional technique used in dealing with this problem is
the simple one of segregation and harshness, the latter feature being
defended as minatory not only to the convict but also to his potential
imitators. Whatever success the application of such principles may
have (and great is the outcry even now that crime can be satis-
factorily eliminated by making the punishment more severe and cer-
tain), two other principles have been introduced: (1) constructive
treatment of the convict 43 and (2) sobial sanitation at the sources
of criminal conduct' 4 -preventive criminology. Most of the litera-
14, Kellor, F. A.: The Criminal Law as Organized Revenge, Ch. 12. Robinson,
James J.: Recent Legislation Concerning Crime. Barnes, H. E.: The Story of
Punishment.
142 DeFord, M. A.: Shall Convicts Write Books, 131 The Nation, p. 495.
In Los Angeles, after the publication of the shocking murder and dismem-
berment of a kidnapped child (December, 1927), it is hardly an exaggeration to
say that a substantial number of citizens thirsted for the blood of the murderer,
the earnest desire to inflict upon him the most excruciating torture being
freely expressed by otherwise sweet and benevolent old gentlemen. Following
the publication of a photograph of the murderer (then still at large), an inno-
cent man, havring the misfortune to seem to resemble the photograph, was
pursued and attacked by an infuriated mob, who were convinced of their error
in identification barely in time to save their victim from being torn limb from
limb.
143 Wines, F. E.: Punishment and Reformation, passim.
144 Ibid., p. 459,--
"It might almost be said that the effective prevention of crime will proceed
par passu with the diffusion of knowledge concerning the causes of crime and
the real nature of criminals. This diffusion doubtless will be greatly aided by
the special training of teachers, judges, lawyers, physicians, ministers, social
workers, and other groups who come into close personal contact with poten-
tial offenders. But the diffusion must be more widespread than that ...
.Doubtless an acquaintance with criminology will be of very little effect in
keeping an individual from becoming a criminal, but it will enable him to
take a more intelligent attitude toward crime in others. It will also lead to a
readier acceptance by society and by legislative and administrative officials of
specific measures of improvement."
Bushee, F. A.: Principles of Sociology, p. 203,-
"For example, formerly, petty violations of law on the part of children in
cities were suppressed by force. . . At the present time a large part of this
lawlessness has been removed by the establishment of playgrounds where
children have a normal outlet for their activities."
Parmelee, Maurice: Op. cit., p. 408.
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ture -on the subject of crime deals with this second principle in its
myriad aspects.14 5
How is the criminal law to be integrated with the considerations
of natural science and sociology, so that there may be "continuous
intelligence brought to bear upon the fundamental problem, and the
application in detail of all that legal and social and medical science
have worked out? ' 146 Whether one's favorite contributing factor
in conduct be companionship, constipation, or congenital capitalism,
crime is a vigorous reality. Though we may deprecate the puerility
of Commissioner Mulrooney, 47 we must sympathize with his frantic
tom-tom beating.
In view of the above it seems that it would be a rational step
for courts of law to adopt a purely objective standard of "guilt,"
determining the simple question, somewhat as of old: "What oc-
curred?" When the court has determined this it has done enough.
Thereafter competent experts could analyze the active personal
agent and decide what ought to be done about him.148 It is true that
345 Vide supra, p. 52.
146 Pound, Roscoe: The Future of the Criminal Law, 21 Columbia L. R., p. 16.
147 New York Herald-Tribune, Feb. 22, 1931: "War Is Declared on New York
Gangsters.
"Swift war against murderers and gangsters was declared tonight by Police
Commissioner Mulrooney.
"Through Acting Detective Chief John J. Sullivan, the commissioner said:
'I want these racketeers and killers dug out of their holes like rats. Dig them
out and bring them in and we'll mug (photograph) them, fingerprint them,
and clap them into jail if we can. They're showing no quarter and we'll show
them no quarter, nor ask for any. We are going to put these people out of
business or know why. And we're going to put their places out of business,
whether they be speakeasies or night clubs or hideaways.'
"Three killings within 30 hours of each other last week prompted the new
order. Detectives believe the murders presage a new and bitter gang war in
New York."
Note, four years later: It hardly needs to be pointed out that the afore-
said gangsters and racketeers are still doing a nice business in their various
specialties on the island of Manhattan; but whether Mulrooney has learned
why, as he promised to do, may be seriously doubted.
148 Parmelee, Maurice: Op. cit., p. 212,-
"In the first place, as we have several times contended, moral responsibil-
ity should be abolished as a fundamental criterion of criminality and should be
replaced by the dangerousness of the criminal to society. The responsibility
and intention of the criminal will then become indications of his character.
But so long as the hypothesis of moral liberty remains at the base of the penal
law it will be deductive in character. With the dangerousness of the crim-
inal as a criterion, the general principles of penal law can be developed. These
principles will be based upon the sciences which throw light upon the char-
acter of the criminal and uporp the data and statistics concerning crime and the
criminal. They will, however, necessarily be very general in their character,
so as to permit of individualization. This will result in limiting the practical
scope of penal law. On the other hand, as we have already indicated, the
scope of procedure will be increased because the application of the law in
each case will be determined by procedure."
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experts are prone to disagree, and may be mistaken when they do
agree. But the same is fully as true of judges and juries, particu-
larly when they are confronted, as is now frequently the case, with
questions in fields completely outside their acquaintance.
What of our vaunted individualism, so dear to the hearts of the
nineteenth century philosophers and economists? The world of
science and the world of economics, being responsive to facts as they
find them, no longer take it seriously. 149 Theology and the law are
more inclined to prefer the dogma to the fact when the dogma and
the fact conflict. The business man, who likes to divide and con-
quer, accords to individualism lip-service. -
The establishment of fundamentally correct criteria and pre-
ventives of crime is most important and most difficult, and no amount
of painstaking effort can be too great for this huge task, which must
touch the mores at every point, reaching to the heart of the social
order. It has been observed that the racketeering mode of life is
not confined to the heroin-dealer, and that the difference between
the stick-up man and the high pressure salesman, the gangster and
the financial conjurer, serves merely to emphasize certain fragrant
resemblances. 5" It is pressingly important for the law of crimes to
come abreast of these phenomena.
149 Pound, Roscoe: The New Feudalism, 16 Amer. Bar Assoc. Journ., p. 553.
150 Pound and Moore: They Told Barron.
